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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a partial observed two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problem where
the system is governed by a stochastic differential equation of mean-field type. Under standard assumptions on
the coefficients, the maximum principles for optimal open-loop control in a strong sense as well as a weak one
are established by the associated optimal control theory in Tang and Meng (2016). To illustrate the general
results, a class of linear quadratic stochastic differential game problem is discussed and the existence and dual
characterization for the partially observed open-loop saddle are obtained.
1 Introduction
Recently, thanks to many practical applications such as in economics and finance, stochastic optimal control prob-
lems for stochastic differential equation (SDE) of mean-field type have been extensively studied and a number of
important theoretical and practical application results are obtained under full observations or partial observations.
As Djehiche and Tembine (2016) stated in their paper, the speciality of the optimal control problem of mean-field
type is that the coefficients of the stochastic state equation and cost functional are dependent not only on the
state and the control, but also on their probability distribution. The presence of the mean-field term makes the
control problem time-inconsistent and the dynamic programming principle (DPP) ineffective, which motivates to
establish the stochastic maximum principle (SMP) to solve this type of optimal control problems instead of trying
extensions of DPP. And the so-called full observed optimal control problem is that in this case the controller has
full complete information filtration available on the admissible control. We refer to interested readers to Andersson
and Djehiche (2011), Buckdahn et al (2011), Li (2012), Meyer-Brandis et al(2012), Shen and Siu (2013), Du et al
(2013), Elliott(2013), Hafayed (2013), Yong (2013), Chala(2014), Shen et al (2014), Meng and Shen(2015) and the
reference therein for the various optimal control theory results on the mean-field models under full observation. On
the other hand, for the partial observed or partial information optimal control problem, the objective is to find an
optimal control for which the controller has less information than the complete information filtration. In particular,
sometimes an economic model in which there are information gaps among economic agents can be formulated as
a partial information optimal control problem (see Øksendal, B. (2006), Kohlmann and Xiong (2007) ). A great
of results on stochastic optimal control without mean-field term under partial observation or partial information
have been obtained by many authors for various types of stochastic systems via establishing the corresponding
MP and DPP. See e.g., Bensoussan(1983), Tang (1998), Baghery et al. (2007), Wu(2010), Wang and Wu(2009),
Wang et al(2013, 2015a), and the reference therein for more detailed discussion. Recently, for partial observed
stochastic optimal control problem of stochastic systems of mean-field type, due to the theoretical and practical
interest, it become more popular, e.g, Wang et al (2014a, 2014b, 2015b, 2016), Djehiche and Tembine (2016), Ma
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and Liu (2017), where the corresponding maximum principles are established and practical finance applications are
illustrated.
This purpose of this paper is to extend the optimal control problem to two-person zero-sum differential game
problem for SDE of mean-field type under partial observation. As stated in Basar (2010), game theory deals
with strategic interactions among multiple decision makers, called players (and in some context agents), with each
players preference ordering among multiple alternatives captured in an objective function for that player, which she
either tries to maximize (in which case the objective function is a utility function or benefit function) or minimize
(in which case we refer to the objective function as a cost function or a loss function). Specially, we say that
a game problem has the zero-sum property which means that there is a single performance criterion which one
player tries to minimize and the other tries to maximize. Differential game theory investigates conflict problems
in systems which are driven by differential equations. This topic lies at the intersection of game theory (several
players are involved) and of controlled systems (the differential equations are controlled by the players). The theory
of differential games was initiated by Issacs(1954). It was later studied in greater detail by Fleming and Berkovitz
(1955). After the development of Pontryagins maximum principle, it became clear that there was a connection
between differential games and optimal control theory. In fact, differential game problems represent a generalization
of optimal control problems in cases where there are more than one controller or player. However, differential games
are conceptually far more complex than optimal control problems in the sense that it is no longer obvious what
constitutes a solution; indeed, there are a number of different types of solutions such as minimax solutions for
zerosum differential games, Nash solutions for nonzero-sum game problems , Stackelberg differential games, along
with possibilities of cooperation and bargaining, see Basar and Olsder (1999), Sethi and Thompson(2000). For
the partial information stochastic differential games, recently, An and Øksendal (2008) established a maximum
principle for forward systems with Poisson jumps. Moreover, we refer to Wang and Yu (2010, 2012), Meng and
Tang(2010), Xiong et al (2016) and the references therein for more associated results on the partial information or
partial observed differential games for all kinds of different stochastic systems without mean-field terms.
But to our best knowledge, there is few discussions on the partial observed stochastic differential games problem
for the stochastic system of mean-field type, which motives us to write this paper. The main contribution of this
paper is to establish the partial observed maximum principle in the weak formulation and strong formulation for the
optimal open-loop control under our two-person zero-sum differential games framework by using the results in Tang
and Meng (2016). The results obtained in this paper can be considered as a generalization of stochastic optimal
control problem of mean-field type to the two-person zero-sum case under partial observations. As an application,
a two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game of linear mean-field stochastic differential equations with a
quadratic cost criteria under partial observation is discussed where the existence of the corresponding open-loop
saddle is obtained and the optimal control is characterized explicitly by adjoint processes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce useful notations and formulate the two-person
zero-sum differential game problem for mean-field SDEs under partial observation. Section 2 is devoted to the
necessary maximum principle in a weak formulation for optimal open-loop control by the optimal control theory
in Tang and Meng (2016). In Section 3, necessary as well as sufficient optimality conditions for our differential
games in a strong formulation is derived. As an application, a class of linear quadratic stochastic differential game
problem under partial observations is studied.
2 Basic Notations
In this section, we introduce some basic notations which will be used in this paper. Let T := [0, T ] denote a
finite time index, where 0 < T < ∞. We consider a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with two
one-dimensional standard Brownian motions {W (t), t ∈ T } and {Y (t), t ∈ T }, respectively. Let {FWt }t∈T and
{FYt }t∈T be P-completed natural filtration generated by {W (t), t ∈ T } and {Y (t), t ∈ T }, respectively. Set
{Ft}t∈T := {F
W
t }t∈T
∨
{FYt }t∈T ,F = FT . Denote by E[·] the expectation under the probablity P. Let E be a
Euclidean space. The inner product in E is denoted by 〈·, ·〉, and the norm in E is denoted by | · |. Let A⊤ denote
the transpose of the matrix or vector A. For a function φ : Rn −→ R, denote by φx its gradient. If φ : R
n −→ Rk
(with k ≥ 2), then φx = (
∂φi
∂xj
) is the corresponding k×n-Jacobian matrix. By P we denote the predictable σ field
on Ω × [0, T ] and by B(Λ) the Borel σ-algebra of any topological space Λ. In the follows, K represents a generic
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constant, which can be different from line to line.
Next we introduce some spaces of random variable and stochastic processes. For any α, β ∈ [1,∞), we let
• Mβ
F
(0, T ;E) : the space of all E-valued and Ft-adapted processes f = {f(t, ω), (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω} satisfying
‖f‖
M
β
F
(0,T ;E) ,
(
E
[ ∫ T
0
|f(t)|βdt
]) 1β
<∞.
• Sβ
F
(0, T ;E) : the space of all E-valued and Ft-adapted ca`dla`g processes f = {f(t, ω), (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω}
satisfying ‖f‖
S
β
F
(0,T ;E) ,
(
E
[
sup
t∈T
|f(t)|β
]) 1
β
< +∞.
• Lβ(Ω,F , P ;E) : the space of all E-valued random variables ξ on (Ω,F , P ) satisfying ‖ξ‖Lβ(Ω,F ,P ;E) ,√
E|ξ|β <∞.
• Mβ
F
(0, T ;Lα(0, T ;E)) : the space of all Lα(0, T ;E)-valued and Ft-adapted processes f = {f(t, ω), (t, ω) ∈
[0, T ]× Ω} satisfying ‖f‖α,β ,

E
[(∫ T
0
|f(t)|αdt
) β
α ]

1
β
<∞.
2.1 Formulation of Two-Person Zero-Sum Differential Games of Mean-Field Type
Under Partial Observation
In the following, we formulate a partial observed two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problem in a
weak form and a strong form, respectively, where the system is governed by the following nonlinear mean-field
stochastic differential equation

dx(t) = b(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dt
+g(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dW (t)
+g˜(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dW
(u1,u2)(t),
x(0) = a ∈ Rn,
(2.1)
with an obvervation{
dY (t) = h(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dt + dW
(u1,u2)(t),
y(0) = 0,
(2.2)
where b : T × Ω × Rn × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2 → R
n, g : T × Ω × Rn × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2 → R
n,
g˜ : T × Ω × Rn × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2 → R
n, h : T × Ω × Rn × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2 → R, are given
random mapping with U1 ⊂ R
k1 and U2 ⊂ R
k2 being two given nonempty convex sets. In the above, u1(·) and u2(·)
are partial observed stochastic processes called admissible control processes of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively
defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. For i = 1, 2, a partial observed admissible control process for Player i is defined as a stochastic
process ui : T × Ω −→ Ui which is {F
Y
t }t∈T -adapted and satisfies
E
[(∫ T
0
|ui(t)|
2dt
)2]
<∞. (2.3)
The set of all admissible controls is denoted by AWi , i = 1, 2. The control pair (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A
W
1 ×A
W
2 is called a
pair of admissible controls of players.
Now we make the following standard assumptions on the coefficients of the equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Assumption 2.1. The coefficients b, g, g˜ and h are P ⊗ B(Rn) ⊗ B(Rn) ⊗ B(U1) ⊗ B(U1) ⊗ B(U2) ⊗ B(U2)-
measurable. For each (x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) ∈ R
n×Rn×U1×U1×U2×U2, b(·, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2), g(·, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2),
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g˜(·, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) and h(·, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) are all {Ft}t∈T -adapted processes. For almost all (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω,
the mapping
(x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)→ ϕ(t, ω, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)
is continuous differentiable with respect to (x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) with appropriate growths, where ϕ = b, g, g˜ and
h. More precisely, there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ Rn, u1, v1 ∈ U1, u2, v2 ∈ U2 and a.e.
(t, ω) ∈ T × Ω,

(1 + |x|+ |y|+ |u1|+ |v1|+ |u2|+ |v2|)
−1|φ(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |φx(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|
+ |φy(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |φu1(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |φv1 (t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|
+ |φu2 (t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |φv2(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)| ≤ C,ϕ = b, g, g˜;
|h(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |hx(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |hy(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |hu1(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|
+ |hv1(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |hu2(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |hv2(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)| ≤ C.
Now under Assumption 2.1, we begin to discuss the well- posedness of (2.1) and (2.2). Indeed, putting (2.2)
into the state equation (2.1), we get that

dx(t) = [(b − g˜h)(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])]dt
+g(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dW (t)
+g˜(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dY (t),
x(0) = a.
(2.4)
Under Assumption 2.1, for any (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A
W
1 ×A
W
2 , by Lemma 1.4 in Tang and Meng (2016), (2.4) admits a
strong solution x(·) ≡ x(u1,u2)(·) ∈ S4
F
(0, T ;Rn). On the other hand, for any (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A
W
1 ×A
W
2 , associated
with the corresponding solution x(u1,u2)(·) of (2.4), introduce a stochastic process Z(u1,u2)(·) defined by the unique
solution of the following mean-field SDE{
dZ(u1,u2)(t) = Z(u1,u2)(t)h(t, x(u1,u2)(t),E[x(u1,u2)(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dY (t),
Z(u1,u2)(0) = 1.
(2.5)
Define a new probability measure P(u1,u2) on (Ω,F ) by dP(u1,u2) = Z(u1,u2)(1)dP. Then from Girsanov’s theorem
and (2.2), (W (·),W (u1,u2)(·)) is an R2-valued standard Brownian motion defined in the new probability space
(Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P
(u1,u2)). So (P(u1,u2), X(u1,u2)(·), Y (·),W (·),W (u1,u2)(·)) is a weak solution on (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈T )
of (2.1) and (2.2).
Now for any given pair of admissible control (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A
W
1 × A
W
2 , and the corresponding weak solution
(P(u1,u2), x(u1,u2)(·), Y (·),W (·),W (u1,u2)(·)) of (2.1) and (2.2), we introduce the following cost functional in the weak
form,
J(u1(·), u2(·)) =E
(u1,u2)
[ ∫ T
0
l(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dt
+m(x(T ),E[x(T )])
]
.
(2.6)
where E(u1,u2) denotes the expectation with respect to the probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P
(u1,u2)) and l :
T × Ω × Rn × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2 → R, m : Ω × R
n × Rn → R are given random mappings satisfying the
following assumption:
Assumption 2.2. l is P ⊗ B(Rn) ⊗ B(Rn) ⊗ B(U1) ⊗ B(U1) ⊗ B(U2) ⊗ B(U2)-measurable, and m is FT ⊗
B(Rn) ⊗ B(Rn)-measurable. For each (x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) ∈ R
n × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2, f(·, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)
is an F-adapted process, and m(x, y) is an FT -measurable random variable . For almost all (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, the
mappings
(x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)→ l(t, ω, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)
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and
(x, y)→ m(ω, x, y)
are continuous differentiable with respect to (x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) with appropriate growths, respectively. More pre-
cisely, there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ Rn, u1, v1 ∈ U1, u2, v2 ∈ U2 and a.e. (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω,

(1 + |x|+ |y|+ |u1|+ |v1|+ |u2|+ |v2|)
−1(|lx(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |ly(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|
+ |lu1(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |lv1(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |lu2(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|+ |lv2(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)|)
+ (1 + |x|2 + |y|2 + |u1|
2 + |v1|
2 + |u2|
2 + |v|2)−1|l(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)| ≤ C;
(1 + |x|2 + |y|2)−1|m(x, y)|+ (1 + |x|+ |y|)−1(|mx(x, y)|+ |my(x, y)|) ≤ C.
Under Assumption 2.1 and 2.2, by the estimates in Lemma 1.4 in Tang and Meng (2016), we get that the cost
functional is well-defined.
Then we can put forward the following partially observed two-person zero-sum differential game problem in its
weak formulation, i.e., with changing the reference probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P
u), as follows.
Problem 2.1. Find a pair of admissible control pair (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) over A
W
1 ×A
W
2 such that
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = sup
u2(·)∈AW2
(
inf
u1(·)∈AW1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= inf
uW
1
(·)∈AW
1
(
inf
u2(·)∈AW2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
, (2.7)
subject to the state equation (2.1), the observation equation (2.2) and the cost functional (2.6).
Obviously, according to Bayes’ formula, the cost functional (2.6) can be rewritten as
J(u1(·), u2(·)) =E
[ ∫ T
0
Z(u1,u2)(t)l(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dt
+ Z(u1,u2)(T )m(x(T ),E[x(T )])
]
.
(2.8)
Therefore, we can translate Problem 2.1 into the following equivalent optimal control problem in its strong formula-
tion, i.e., without changing the reference probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P), where Z
(u1,u2)(·) will be regarded
as an additional state process besides the state process x(u1,u2)(·).
Problem 2.2. Find an admissible open-loop control (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) over A
W
1 ×A
W
2 such that
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = sup
u2(·)∈AW2
(
inf
u1(·)∈AW1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= inf
u1(·)∈AW1
(
inf
u2(·)∈AW2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
, (2.9)
subject to the cost functional (2.8) and the following state equation

dx(t) = [(b− g˜h)(t, x(t), u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)]]dt
+g(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dW (t)
+g˜(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dY (t),
dZ(t) = Z(t)h(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dY (t),
Z(0) = 1,
x(0) = a ∈ Rn.
(2.10)
Any (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ∈ A
W
1 ×A
W
2 satisfying (2.12) is called an optimal open-loop control. The corresponding strong
solution (x¯(·), Z¯(·)) of (2.10) is called the optimal state process. Then (u¯1(·), u¯2(·); x¯(·), Z¯(·)) is called an optimal
pair.
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Roughly speaking, for the zero-sum differential game, Player I seek control u¯1(·) to minimize (2.8), and Player
II seek control u¯2(·) to maximize (2.8). Therefore, (2.8) represents the cost for Player I and the payoff for Player
II. If (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an optimal open-loop control, it is easy to check that
J(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u¯2(·)) (2.11)
for all admissible open-loop controls (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A1 ×A2. We refer to (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) as an open-loop saddle. On
the other hand, if (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an open-loop saddle, by Remark 1.2 of Chapter VI in [6], we know that
sup
u2(·)∈AW2
(
inf
u1(·)∈AW1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= inf
u1(·)∈AW1
(
inf
u2(·)∈AW2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
. (2.12)
In this paper, provided the original sate equation (2.1) and the observation equation (2.2), we will also study the
partially observed optimal control problem in its strong formulation, i.e. without changing the reference probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P). Precisely, different from the cost functional (2.6), the cost functional in this case is
defined by
J(u1(·), u2(·)) =E
[ ∫ T
0
l(t,X(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dt
+m(X(T ),E[x(T )])
]
.
(2.13)
Note that E(·) is the expectation with the original probability P independent of the control (u1(·), u2(·)). In this
case, different from the partially observed optimal control problem in weak sense discussed before, we do not need
require the pair of admissible control processes satisfies (2.3). In this case, a pair of admissible control processes
(u1(·), u2(·)) is defined as a {F
Y
t }0≤t≤T adapted stochastic process valued in U1 × U2 satisfying
E
[ ∫ T
0
|u1(t)|
2dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
|u2(t)|
2dt
]
<∞. (2.14)
The set of all admissible controls in this case is denoted by AS1 ×A
S
2 .
Then we can put forward the partially observed two-person zero-sum differential game problem in its strong
formulation as follows.
Problem 2.3. Find an admissible open-loop control (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) over A
W
1 ×A
W
2 such that
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = sup
u2(·)∈AS2
(
inf
u1(·)∈AS1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= inf
u1(·)∈AS1
(
inf
u2(·)∈AS2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
, (2.15)
subject to the cost functional (2.8) and the following state equation

dx(t) = [(b − g˜h)(t, x(t), u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)]]dt
+g(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dW (t)
+g˜(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)])dY (t),
x(0) = a ∈ Rn.
(2.16)
Note that under Assumptions2.1 and 2.2, for any admissible control (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A
S
1 × A
S
2 , by Lemma 1.4
in Tang and Meng (2016), the state (2.10) has a unique solution x(·) ∈ S2
F
(0, T ;Rn) and J(u1(·), u2(·)) < ∞, so
Problem 2.3 is well-defined.
3 Stochastic Maximum Principle For Zero-Sum Differential Games in
Weak Formulation
This section is devoted to establishing the stochastic maximum principle of Problem 2.1 or Problem 2.2, i.e.,
establishing the necessary optimality condition of Pontryagin’s type for a pair of admissible controles to be optimal.
6
To this end, for the state equation (2.10), we first introduce the corresponding adjoint equation. Actually, define
the Hamiltonian function H : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × Rn × U1 × U2 × U2 × U2 × R
n × Rn × Rn × R −→ R by
H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2, p, q, q˜, R˜)
= 〈p, b(t, x, y, , u1, v1, u2, v2)〉+ 〈q, g(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)〉+ 〈q˜, g˜(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)〉
+ R˜h(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) + l(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2).
(3.1)
For the state equation (2.10) associated with any given admissible pair (u¯1(·), u¯2(·), x¯(·), Z¯(·)), the corresponding
adjoint equation is defined as follows:


dr¯(t) = −l(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dt+ R¯ (t) dW (t) +
¯˜
R (t) dW u¯ (t) ,
dp¯ (t) = −
{
Hx (t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])
+
1
z(u1,u2)(t)
E
(u1,u2)
[
Hy (t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])
]}
dt
+ q¯ (t) dW (t) + ¯˜q (t) dW (u¯1,u¯2) (t) ,
r¯(T ) = m(x¯(T ),E[x¯(T )]),
p¯(T ) = mx(x¯(T ),E[x¯(T )]) +
1
z(u1,u2)(T )
E
u [mx(x¯(T ),E[x¯(T )])] ,
(3.2)
where
H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)
=: H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2, p¯(t), q¯(t), ¯˜q(t),
¯˜
R(t) − g˜(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])
⊤p¯(t)).
(3.3)
Note the adjoint equation (3.2) is a mean-field backward stochastic differential equation whose solution consists of
an 6-tuple process (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·), r¯(·), R¯(·), ¯˜R(·)). Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, by Buckdahn (2009b), it is easily
to see that the adjoint equation (3.2) admits a unique solution (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·), r¯(·), R¯(·), ¯˜R(·)) ∈ S2
F
(0, T ;Rn) ×
M2
F
(0, T ;Rn) ×M2
F
(0, T ;Rn) × S2
F
(0, T ;R) ×M2
F
(0, T ;R) ×M2
F
(0, T ;R), also called the adjoint process corre-
sponding the admissible pair (u¯(·); x¯(·), Z¯(·)).
Now we are in a position to state our main result: stochastic maximum principle of Problem 2.1 or 2.2.
Theorem 3.1. Let assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 be satisfied. Let (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) be an optimal open-loop control of Prob-
lem 2.1 or 2.2. Suppose that (x¯(·), Z¯(·)) is the state process of the system (2.10) corresponding to (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)). Let
(p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·), r¯(·), R¯(·), ¯˜R(·)) be the unique solution of the adjoint equation (3.2) corresponding (u¯1(·), u¯2(·); x¯(·), Z¯(·)).
Then the optimality conditions〈
E
[
Z(u¯1,u¯2)(t)H¯u1(t)|F
Y
t ] + E
(u¯1,u¯2)[H¯v1(t)], u1 − u¯1(t)
〉
≥ 0 (3.4)
and
〈
E
[
Z(u¯1,u¯2)(t)H¯u2(t)|F
Y
t ] + E
(u¯1,u¯2)[H¯v2(t)], u2 − u¯2(t)
〉
≤ 0 (3.5)
hold for any (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2 and a.e. (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω. Here using the notation (3.3), for i = 1, 2, we set
H¯ui(t) = Hu(t, x¯(t),E[¯x(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)]) (3.6)
and
H¯vi(t) = Hvi(t, x(t),E[x¯(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)]). (3.7)
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Proof: Since (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an optimal open-loop control, then (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an open-loop saddle point, i.e.,
J(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u¯2(·)). (3.8)
So we have
J1(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = min
u1(·)∈AW1
J1(u1(·), u¯2(·)) (3.9)
and
J2(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = max
u2(·)∈AW2
J2(u¯1(·), u2(·)). (3.10)
By (3.9), u¯1(·) can be regarded as an optimal control of an optimal control problem where the controlled system is

dx(t) = [(b− g˜h)(t, x(t), u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)]]dt
+g(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dW (t)
+g˜(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dY (t),
dZ(t) = Z(t)h(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dY (t),
Z(0) = 1,
x(0) = a ∈ Rn,
(3.11)
and the cost functional is
J(u1(·), u¯2(·)) =E
[ ∫ T
0
Z(u1,u¯2)(t)l(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dt
+ Z(u1,u¯2)(T )m(x(T ),E[x(T )])
]
.
(3.12)
Then for this case, it is easy to check that the Hamilton is H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)], p, q, q˜, R˜) and for the
optimal control u¯1(·) ∈ A
W
1 , the corresponding optimal sate process and the adjoint process is still x¯(·) and
(p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·), r¯(·), R¯(·), ¯˜R(·)), respectively. Thus applying the partial necessary stochastic maximum principle for
optimal control problems (see Theorem 2.1 in Tang and Meng (2016)), we can obtain (3.4). Similarly, from (3.10),
we can obtain (3.5). The proof is complete.
4 Stochastic Maximum Principle For Zero-Sum Differential Games in
Strong Formulation
This section is devoted to establishing the stochastic maximum principles of Problem 2.3. In this case, the Hamil-
tonian H : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × Rn × U1 × U1 × U2 × U2 × R
n × Rn × Rn → R is defined by
H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2, p, q, q˜) =〈p, b(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)− g˜(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)h(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)〉
+ 〈q, g(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)〉+ 〈q˜, g˜(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2)〉
+ l(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2).
(4.1)
Then for any admissible pair (u¯1(·), u¯2(·); x¯(·)), the corresponding adjoint process is defined as the solution to the
following mean-field BSDE:


dp¯ (t) = −
[
H¯x(t) + E[H¯y(t)]
]
dt+ q¯ (t) dW (t) + ¯˜q (t) dY (t)
P¯ (T ) = m¯x(T ) + E[m¯y(T )],
(4.2)
where we have used the following shorthand notation{
H¯(t) =H(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)], p¯(t), q¯(t), ¯˜q(t)),
m¯(T ) =m(x¯(T ),E[x¯(T )]).
(4.3)
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Under Assumption 2.1 and 2.2, by Buckdahn (2009), (4.2) admits a unique strong slution (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·)) ∈
S2
F
(0, T ;Rn) × M2
F
(0, T ;Rn) × M2
F
(0, T ;Rn), which is also called the adjoint process corresponding to the ad-
missible pair (u1(·), u2(·), x(·))
4.1 Sufficient Conditions of Optimality
In this subsection, we are going to establish the sufficient Pontryagin maximum principle of Problem 2.3.
Theorem 4.1. [Sufficient Stochastic Maximum Principle ] Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 be satisfied. Let
(u¯1(·), u¯2(·); x¯(·)) be an admissible pair and (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·)) be the unique strong solution of the corresponding adjoint
equation (4.2).
(i) Suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], m(x, y) is convex in (x, y), and the mapping
(x, y, u1, v1) 7→ H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)], p¯(t), q¯(t), ¯˜q(t))
is convex. For any u1(·) ∈ A
S
1 ,
E
[
〈u1(t)− u¯1(t), H¯u1 (t) + E[H¯v1(t)]〉
]
≥ 0. (4.4)
Then
J(u1(·), u¯2(·)) ≥ J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)), for all u1(·) ∈ A
S
1
and
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = inf
u1(·)∈AS1
J(u1(·), u¯2(·)).
(ii) Suppose that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], m(x, y) is concave in (x, y) and
(x, y, u2, v2) 7→ H(t, x, y, u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u2, v2, p¯(t), q¯(t), ¯˜q(t))
is concave. For any u2(·) ∈ A
S
2 ,
E
[
〈u2(t)− u¯2(t), H¯u2 (t) + E[H¯v2(t)]〉
]
≤ 0. (4.5)
Then
J(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)), for all u2(·) ∈ A
S
2
and
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = sup
u2(·)∈AS2
J(u¯1(·), u2(·)).
(iii) If both case (i) and (ii) hold (which implies, in particular, that m(x, y) is an affine function), then
(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an open-loop saddle point and
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = supu2(·)∈AS2
(
infu1(·)∈AS1 J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= infu1(·)∈AS1
(
infu2(·)∈AS2 J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
. (4.6)
Proof. (i) In the following, we consider a stochastic optimal control problem over AS1 where the system is

dx(t) = [(b − g˜h)(t, x(t), u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)]]dt
+g(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dW (t)
+g˜(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dY (t),
x(0) = a ∈ Rn
(4.7)
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with the cost functional
J(u1(·), u¯2(·)) =E
[ ∫ T
0
l(t,X(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)])dt
+m(X(T ),E[x(T )])
]
.
(4.8)
Our optimal control problem is minimize J(u1(·), u¯2(·)) over u1(·) ∈ A
S
1 , i.e., find u¯1(·) ∈ A
S
1 such that
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = inf
u1(·)∈A1
J(u1(·), u¯2(·)). (4.9)
Then for this case, it is easy to check that the Hamilton is H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)], p, q, q˜) and for the ad-
missible control u¯1(·) ∈ A
S
1 , the corresponding sate process and the adjoint process is still x¯(·) and (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·))
respectively. Thus from the partial observed sufficient maximum principle for optimal control (see Theorem 3.1 in
Tang and Meng (2016)), we conclude that u¯1(·) is the optimal control of the optimal control problem, i.e.,
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u¯2(·)), for all u1(·) ∈ A
S
1 ,
and
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = inf
u1(·)∈AS1
J(u1(·), u¯2(·)).
The proof of (i) is complete.
(ii) This statement can be proved in a similar way as (i).
(iii) if both (i) and (ii) hold, then
J(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u¯2(·)),
for any (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ A
S
1 ×A
S
2 . Thereby,
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≤ inf
u1(·)∈AS1
J(u1(·), u¯2(·))
≤ supu2(·)∈AS2
(
inf
u1(·)∈AS1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
.
On the other hand,
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≥ sup
u2(·)∈AS2
J(u¯1(·), u2(·))
≥ inf
u1(·)∈AS1
(
sup
u2(·)∈AS2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
.
Now, due to the inequality
inf
u1(·)∈AS1
(
sup
u2(·)∈AS2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
≥ supu2(·)∈AS2
(
infu1(·)∈AS1 J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
,
we have
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = sup
u2∈AS2
(
inf
u1∈AS1
J(u1, u2)
)
= infu1(·)∈AS1
(
supu2(·)∈AS2 J(u1, u2)
)
.
The proof is completed.
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4.2 Necessary Conditions of Optimality
In this subsection we give the necessary Pontryagin maximum principle of Problem 2.3.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 be satisfied. Let (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) be an optimal open-loop control of
Problem 2.3. Suppose that x¯(·) is the state process of the system (2.10) corresponding to the admissible control
(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)). Let (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·), r¯(·), R¯(·),
¯˜
R(·)) be the unique solution of the adjoint equation (4.2) corresponding
to (u¯1(·), u¯2(·); x¯(·)). Then the optimality conditions〈
E
[
H¯u1(t)|F
Y
t ] + E[H¯v1(t)], u1 − u¯1(t)
〉
≥ 0 (4.10)
and
〈
E
[
H¯u2(t)|F
Y
t ] + E[H¯v1(t)], u2 − u¯2(t)
〉
≤ 0 (4.11)
holds for any (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2 and a.e. (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω. Here using the notation (3.11), for i = 1, 2, we set
H¯ui(t) = Hui(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)]) (4.12)
and
H¯vi(t) = Hvi(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], u¯1(t),E[u¯1(t)], u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)]). (4.13)
Proof: Since (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an optimal open-loop control, then (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is an open-loop saddle point, i.e.,
J(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u¯2(·)). (4.14)
So we have
J1(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = min
u1(·)∈AS1
J1(u1(·), u¯2(·)) (4.15)
and
J2(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = max
u2(·)∈AS2
J2(u¯1(·), u2(·)). (4.16)
By (4.15), u¯1(·) can be regarded as an optimal control of the optimal control problem where the controlled
system is (4.7) and the cost functional is (4.8). Then for this case, it is easy to check that the Hamilton is
H(t, x, y, u1, v1, u¯2(t),E[u¯2(t)], p, q, q˜) and for the admissible control u¯1(·) ∈ A
S
1 , the corresponding sate process
and the adjoint process is still x¯(·) and (p¯(·), q¯(·), ¯˜q(·)) respectively. Thus applying the partial necessary stochastic
maximum principle for optimal control problems (see Theorem 3.5 in Tang and Meng (2016)), we can obtain (4.10).
Similarly, from (4.16), we can obtain (4.11). The proof is completed.
5 An Example: A Linear Quadratic Differential Game Problem
In this section, we apply our stochastic maximum principle to solve a partial observed stochastic linear quadratic
differential game problem. Let us make it more precise below. In this case, we assume the state system is the
following linear mean-field SDE

dX(t) = (A1(t)X(t) +A2(t)E[X(t)] +B11(t)u1(t) +B12(t)E[u1(t)] +B21(t)u2(t) +B22(t)E[u2(t)])dt
+(C1(t)X(t) + C2(t)E[X(t)] +D11(t)u1(t) +D12(t)E[u1(t)] +D21(t)u2(t) +D22(t)E[u2(t)])dW (t)
+(F1(t)X(t) + F2(t)E[X(t)] +G11(t)u1(t) +G12(t)E[u1(t)] +G21(t)u2(t) +G22(t)E[u2(t)])dW
(u1,u2)(t),
x(0) = x ∈ Rn,
(5.1)
with an observation {
dY (t) = h(t)dt+ dW (u1,u2)(t),
Y (0) = 0,
(5.2)
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and the cost functional has the following quadratic form:
J(u1(·), u2(·)) =E[〈M,X(T )〉] + E
[ ∫ T
0
〈Q(s), X(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N11(s)u1(s), u1(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N12(s)E[u1(s)],E[u1(s)]〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N21(s)u2(s), u2(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N22(s)E[u2(s)],E[u2(s)]〉ds
]
.
(5.3)
In this case, our control process (u1(·), u2(·)) is said to be an admissible stochastic process if (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈
M2
FY
(0, T ;Rk1)×M2
FY
(0, T ;Rk2). The set of all admissible controls is also denoted by AS1 ×A
S
2 . Note that there
is no constraint on our control process, since it takes value in Rk1 × RK2 . Now we make the basic assumptions on
the coefficients.
Assumption 5.1. The matrix-valued functions A1, A2, C1, C2, F1, F2, : [0, T ]→ R
n×n;B11, B12, D11, D12, G11, G12, :
[0, T ] → Rn×k1 ;B21, B22, D21, D22, G21, G22, : [0, T ] → R
n×k2 ;N11, N12 : [0, T ] → R
k1×k1 ;N21, N22 : [0, T ] →
R
k2×k2 ;Q : [0, T ]→ Rn;h : [0, T ]→ R are uniformly bounded measurable functions. M is a vector in Rn.
Assumption 5.2. The matrix-valued functions N11N11 + N12 are uniformly positive, i.e. for ∀u1 ∈ R
k1 and
a.s. t ∈ [0, T ], 〈N11(t)u1, u1〉 ≥ δ〈u1, u1〉 and 〈(N11(t) + N12(t))u1, u1〉 ≥ δ〈u1, u1〉, for some positive constant
δ. The matrix-valued functions N21N21 + N22 are uniformly negative, i.e. for ∀u2 ∈ R
k2 and a.s. t ∈ [0, T ],
〈N21(t)u2, u2〉 ≤ −δ〈u2, u2〉 and 〈(N21(t) +N22(t))u2, u2〉 ≤ −δ〈u2, u2〉, for some positive constant δ.
Our partial observed stochastic linear quadratic differential game control problem can be stated as follows.
Problem 5.1. Find an admissible open-loop control (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) over A
S
1 ×A
S
2 such that
J(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) = sup
u2(·)∈AS2
(
inf
u1(·)∈AS1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= inf
u1(·)∈AS1
(
inf
u2(·)∈AS2
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
, (5.4)
subject to (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3).
It is easy to check that under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, if we set
b(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) = A1(t)x+A2(t)y +B11(t)u1 +B12(t)v1 +B21(t)u2 +B22(t)v2,
g(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) = C1(t)x+ C2(t)y +D11(t)u1 +D12(t)v1 +D21(t)u2 +D22(t)v2,
g˜(t, x, y, u, v) = F1(t)x + F2(t)y +G11(t)u1 +G12(t)v1 +G21(t)u2 +G22(t)v2,
h(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) = h(t),m(x, y) = 〈M,x〉,
l(t, x, y, u1, v1, u2, v2) = 〈Q1(t), x〉 + 〈N11(t)u1, u1〉+ 〈N12(t)v1, v1〉+ 〈N21(t)u2, u2〉+ 〈N22(t)v2, v2〉.
(5.5)
Problem 5.1 can be regarded as a special case of Problem 2.3 and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 for (5.5) hold. Thus
Theorem 4.1 and 4.2 can be applied to solve Problem 5.1. In this case, the Hamiltonian becomes
H(t, x, y, u, v, p, q, q˜)
=〈p,A1(t)x +A2(t)y +B11(t)u1 +B12(t)v1 +B21(t)u2 +B22(t)v2
− h(t)(F1(t)x+ F2(t)y +G11(t)u1 +G12(t)v1 +G21(t)u2 +G22(t)v2)〉
+ 〈q, C1(t)x + C2(t)y +D11(t)u1 +D12(t)v1 +D21(t)u2 +D22(t)v2〉
+ 〈q˜, F1(t)x + F2(t)y +G11(t)u1 +G12(t)v1 +G21(t)u2 +G22(t)v2〉
+ 〈Q1, x〉+ 〈N11u1, u1〉+ 〈N12v1, v1〉+ 〈N21u2, u2〉+ 〈N22v2, v2〉.
(5.6)
For any admissible pair (u1(·), u2(·);x(·)), the corresponding adjoint equation becomes
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

dp(t) = −
[
(A⊤1 (t)− h(t)F
⊤
1 (t))p(t) + (A
⊤
2 (t)− h(t)F
⊤
2 (t))E[p(t)] + C
⊤
1 (t)q(t)
+C⊤2 (t)E[q(t)] + F
⊤
1 (t)q˜(t) + F
⊤
2 (t)E[q˜(t)] +Q(t)
]
dt
+q(t)dW (t) + q˜(t)dY (t),
p(T ) = M.
(5.7)
In the following, we will prove Problem 5.1 admits at least an open-loop saddle point (u¯(·), u¯2(·)) ∈ A
S
1 × A
S
2 . To
the end, we need the following basic result on a saddle point in convex analysis theory.
Lemma 5.2. (Proposition 2.4 of Chapter VI in Ekeland and Te´mam (1976)). Let A and B be two reflex Banach
space. Assume that a function L of A× B −→ R satisfies
∀u ∈ A, p −→ L(u, p)
is concave upper-semi continuous and
∀p ∈ A, u −→ L(u, p)
is convex lower-semi continuous. Moreover, there exist u0 ∈ A and p0 ∈ B such that
lim
||u||−→∞
L(u, p0) = +∞
and
lim
||p||−→∞
L(u0, p) = −∞.
Then L possesses at least one saddle point on L.
Theorem 5.3. Let Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 be satisfied. Then Problem 5.1 has at least an saddle point (u¯(·), u¯2(·)) ∈
AS1 ×A
S
2 and
sup
u2(·)∈A2
(
inf
u1(·)∈A1
J(u1(·), u2(·))
)
= inf
u1(·)∈A1
( sup
u2(·)∈A2
J(u1(·), u2(·))). (5.8)
Proof. Since AS1 = M
2
FY
(0, T ;Rk1) and AS2 = M
2
FY
(0, T ;Rk2) are s Hilbert spaces thus reflexive Banach spaces.
Indeed, by the a priori estimate for the state process in Lemma 1.4 in Tang and Meng (2016), over AS1 ×A
S
2 , we
can show that the cost functional J(u1(·), u2(·)) is continuous with respect to (u1(·), u2(·)) and hence lower-semi
continuous with respect to u1(·) and upper-semi continuous with respect to u2(·), respectively. Since the weighting
matrices in the cost functional are not random, from the definition of J(u1(·), u2(·)) (see (5.3)) and by a simple
calculation, we can get that
J(u1(·), u2(·)) =E
[ ∫ T
0
(
〈N1(t)(u(t)− E[u(t)]), u(t)− E[u(t)]〉 + 〈(N1(t) +N2(t))E[u(t)],E[u(t)]〉
)
dt
]
+ E
[
〈M,X(T )〉
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
(
〈Q(t), X(t)〉
)
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N21(s)u2(s), u2(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N22(s)E[u2(s)],E[u2(s)]〉ds
]
.
(5.9)
Thus the cost functional J(u1(·), u2(·)) is convex with respect to u1(·) over A
S
1 from the nonnegativity of the
N11, N11 + N12. Furthermore, it follows from the uniformly strictly positivity of N11, N11 + N12 and the a priori
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estimate for the state process, that
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥δE
[ ∫ T
0
〈u1(t)− E[u1(t)], u1(t)− E[u1(t)]〉dt
]
+ δE
[ ∫ T
0
〈E[u1(t)],E[u1(t)]〉dt
]
−K||u1(·)||AS
1
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N21(s)u2(s), u2(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N22(s)E[u2(s)],E[u2(s)]〉ds
]
.
=δ||u1(·)||
2
AS
1
−K||u1(·)||AS
1
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N21(s)u2(s), u2(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N22(s)E[u2(s)],E[u2(s)]〉ds
]
,
(5.10)
which implies
lim
‖u1(·)‖AS
1
→+∞
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = +∞.
On the other hand, we have
J(u1(·), u2(·)) =E
[ ∫ T
0
(
〈N21(t)(u2(t)− E[u2(t)]), u2(t)− E[u2(t)]〉+ 〈(N21(t) +N22(t))E[u2(t)],E[u2(t)]〉
)
dt
]
+ E
[
〈M,X(T )〉
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈Q(t), X(t)〉dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N11(s)u1(s), u1(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N12(s)E[u1(s)],E[u1(s)]〉ds
]
.
(5.11)
Thus the cost functional J(u1(·), u2(·)) over A
S
2 is concave with respect to u2(·) from the negativity of the
N21, N21 +N22,. Furthermore, it follows from the uniformly strictly negativity of N21, N21 +N22,, that
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤− δE
[ ∫ T
0
〈u2(t)− E[u2(t)], u2(t)− E[u2(t)]〉dt
]
+−δE
[ ∫ T
0
〈E[u2(t)],E[u2(t)]〉dt
]
+K||u2(·)||AS
1
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N11(s)u1(s), u1(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N12(s)E[u1(s)],E[u1(s)]〉ds
]
=− δ||u2(·)||
2
AS
2
+K||u2(·)||AS
2
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N11(s)u1(s), u1(s)〉ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
〈N12(s)E[u1(s)],E[u1(s)]〉ds
]
,
(5.12)
which implies
lim
‖u2(·)‖AS
2
→+∞
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = −∞.
In summary, by Lemma 5.2, Problem 5.1 has at least an saddle point (u¯(·), u¯2(·)) ∈ A
S
1 × A
S
2 . The proof is
complete.
In the following, applying the maximum principle to our LQ differential game problem, we give the dual pre-
sentation of the optimal control in terms of the corresponding adjoint process.
Theorem 5.4. Let Assumptions 5.1and 5.2 be satisfied. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for an admissible
pair (u1(·), u2(·);x(·)) to be an optimal pair of Problem (LQ) is the control (u1(·), u2(·)) satisfies
2N11(t)u(t) + 2N12(t)E[u1(t)] + (B
⊤
1 (t)− h(t)G
⊤
11(t))E[p(t)|F
Y
t ] + (B
⊤
12(t)− h(t)G
⊤
12(t))E[p(t)]
+D⊤12(t)E[q(t)|F
Y
t ] +D
⊤
12(t)E[q(t)] = 0, a.e.a.s.,
(5.13)
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and
2N21(t)u(t) + 2N22(t)E[u(t)] + (B
⊤
1 (t)− h(t)G
⊤
21(t))E[p(t)|F
Y
t ] + (B
⊤
22(t)− h(t)G
⊤
22(t))E[p(t)]
+D⊤21(t)E[q(t)|F
Y
t ] +D
⊤
22(t)E[q(t)] = 0, a.e.a.s.,
(5.14)
where (p(·), q(·), q˜(·)) is the solution to the adjoint equation (5.7) corresponding to (u(·), X(·)).
Proof. For the necessary part, let (u1(·), u2(·), x(·)) be an optimal pair associated with the adjoint process (p(·), q(·), q˜(·)).
Since there is no constraints on the control processes, then from the necessary optimality conditions (4.10) and (4.11)
(see Theorem 4.2), we get that for i = 1, 2,
E
[
Hui(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)], , p(t), q(t), q˜(t))|F
Y
t
]
+ E
[
Hvi(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)], p(t), q(t), q˜(t))
]
= 0,
(5.15)
which leads to (5.14) and (5.13) ( recalling the definition (5.6) of Hamiltonian H).
For the sufficient part, let (u(·), X(·)) be an admissible pair associated with the adjoint process (p(·), q(·), q˜(·))
and assume the conditions (5.1) and (5.14) hold. From the definition of H (see (5.6)), the conditions (5.13) and
(5.14) implies (5.15) holds. Thus, since any admissible control is FYt -adapted process. by(5.15) , for any other
admissible control vi(·) ∈ A
S
i , i = 1, 2, from the property of conditional expectation, we have
E
[〈
vi(t)− ui(t), Hui(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)], p(t), q(t), q˜(t))
+ E
[
Hvi(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)], p(t), q(t), q˜(t))
]〉]
=E
[〈
vi(t)− u¯i(t),E
[
Hu(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)], p(t), q(t), q˜(t))|F
Y
t
]
+ E
[
Hv(t, x(t),E[x(t)], u1(t),E[u1(t)], u2(t),E[u2(t)], p(t), q(t), q˜(t))
]〉]
= 0,
(5.16)
which implies that the conditions (4.8) and (4.5) in Theorem 4.1 holds. Moreover, under Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2,
it is easy to check that all other conditions of (i) and (ii) in Theorem 4.1 are satisfied. Therefore, by (iii) in Theorem
4.1, we conclude that (u1(·), u2(·);x(·)) is an optimal loop-open control pair. The proof is complete.
From the above result, we see that if Problem 2.3 admits an open-loop saddle point, then the following FBSDE
admits an adapted solution (u(·), x(·), p(·), q(·), q˜(·))

dX(t) = (A1(t)X(t) +A2(t)E[X(t)] +B11(t)u1(t) +B12(t)E[u1(t)] + B21(t)u2(t) +B22(t)E[u2(t)])dt
+(C1(t)X(t) + C2(t)E[X(t)] +D11(t)u1(t) +D12(t)E[u1(t)] +D21(t)u2(t) +D22(t)E[u2(t)])dW (t)
+(F1(t)X(t) + F2(t)E[X(t)] +G11(t)u1(t) +G12(t)E[u1(t)] +G21(t)u2(t) +G22(t)E[u2(t)])dW
(u1,u2)(t),
dY (t) = h(t)dt+ dW (u1,u2)(t),
dp(t) = −
[
(A⊤1 (t)− h(t)F
⊤
1 (t))p(t) + (A
⊤
2 (t)− h(t)F
⊤
2 (t))E[p(t)] + C
⊤
1 (t)q(t)
+C⊤2 (t)E[q(t)] + F
⊤
1 (t)q˜(t) + F
⊤
2 (t)E[q˜(t)] +Q(t)
]
dt+ q(t)dW (t) + q˜(t)dY (t),
x(0) = x, p(T ) =M,Y (0) = 0
2Ni1(t)u(t) +2Ni2(t)E[ui(t)] + (B
⊤
i1(t)− h(t)G
⊤
i1(t))E[p(t)|F
Y
t ] + (B
⊤
i2(t)− h(t)G
⊤
i2(t))E[p(t)]
+D⊤i2(t)E[q(t)|F
Y
t ] +D
⊤
i2(t)E[q(t)] = 0, i = 1, 2, a.e.a.s.
(5.17)
Then by Theorem 5.4, we can directly obtain the following equivalence between the solvability of optimality system
(5.17) and the existence of the optimal open-loop control of Problem 5.1.
15
Corollary 5.5. Let Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 be satisfied. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for that
the optimality system (5.17) has a solution (u1(·), u2(·), x(·), p(·), q(·), q˜(·)) ∈ M
2
FY
(0, T ;Rn) ×M2
FY
(0, T ;Rn) ×
S2
F
(0, T ;Rn)× S2
F
(0, T ;Rn)×M2
F
(0, T ;Rn)×M2
F
(0, T ;Rn) is that (u1(·), u2(·);x(·)) is an optimal open-loop pair
of Problem 5.1.
Remark 5.1. In summary, the optimality system (5.17) completely characterizes the optimal open-loop control of
Problem 5.1. Therefore, solving Problem 5.1 is equivalent to solving the optimality system, moreover, the optimal
open-loop control can be given by (5.13) and (5.14) which implies that the optimal loop-open control (u1(·), u2(·))
has the following explicit dual presentation
u¯1(t) =−
1
2
N−111 (t)
{
(B⊤11(t)− h(t)G
⊤
11(t))E[p(t)|F
Y
t ] + (B
⊤
12(t)− h(t)G
⊤
12(t))E[p(t)]
+D⊤11(t)E[q(t)|F
Y
t ] +D
⊤
12(t)E[q(t)]
+N12(t)(N11(t) +N12(t))
−1
[
(B11(t) +B12(t)− h(t)G11(t)− h(t)G12(t))
⊤
E[p(t)]
+ (D11(t) +D12(t))
⊤
E[q(t)]
]}
, a.e.a.s.
(5.18)
and
u¯2(t) =−
1
2
N−121 (t)
{
(B⊤21(t)− h(t)G
⊤
21(t))E[p(t)|F
Y
t ] + (B
⊤
22(t)− h(t)G
⊤
22(t))E[p(t)]
+D⊤21(t)E[q(t)|F
Y
t ] +D
⊤
22(t)E[q(t)]
+N22(t)(N21(t) +N22(t))
−1
[
(B21(t) +B22(t)− h(t)G21(t)− h(t)G22(t))
⊤
E[p(t)]
+ (D21(t) +D22(t))
⊤
E[q(t)]
]}
, a.e.a.s.
(5.19)
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proved partial observed stochastic maximum principle for the stochastic differential games
driven by mean-field stochastic differential equations. As an application, some partial observed linear quadratic
stochastic differential game problem of mean-field type is discussed and the the existence of the open-loop saddle
is obtained and the optimal control process is characterized explicitly by the adjoint process. Our main results
could be seen as an extension of the stochastic optimal control problem studied in Tang and Meng (2016), to the
two-person zero-sum stochastic differential game problem.
References
[1] Andersson, D., & Djehiche, B., 2011. A maximum principle for SDEs of mean-field type. Applied Mathematics
and Optimization, 63, 341-356.
[2] An, T. T. K., & ksendal, B. (2008). Maximum principle for stochastic differential games with partial information.
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 139(3), 463-483.
[3] Baghery, F., Baghery, F., & Øksendal, B. (2007). A maximum principle for stochastic control with partial
information. Stochastic Analysis and Applications, 25(3), 705-717.
[4] Basar, T. (2010). Lecture notes on non-cooperative game theory. Game Theory Module of the Graduate Program
in Network Mathematics, 3-6.
16
[5] Basar, T., & Olsder, G. J. (1999). Dynamic noncooperative game theory (Vol. 23). Siam.
[6] Bensoussan, A., 1983. Maximum principle and dynamic programming approaches of the optimal control of
partially observed diffusions. Stochastics: An International Journal of Probability and Stochastic Processes,
9(3), 169-222.
[7] Berkovitz, L. D., & Fleming, W. H. (1955). On differential games with integral payoff. Annals of Math. Study,
(39), 413-435.
[8] Buckdahn, R., Li, J., & Peng, S., 2009. Mean-field backward stochastic differential equations and related partial
differential equations. Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 119, 3133-3154.
[9] Buckdahn, R., Djehiche, B., & Li, J., 2011. A general stochastic maximum principle for SDEs of mean-field
type. Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 64, 197-216.
[10] Chala, A. (2014). The relaxed optimal control problem for Mean-Field SDEs systems and application. Auto-
matica, 50(3), 924-930.
[11] Djehiche, B., & Tembine, H. (2016). Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Type Control Under Partial Observation. In
Stochastics of Environmental and Financial Economics (pp. 243-263). Springer International Publishing.
[12] Du, H., Huang, J., & Qin, Y. (2013). A stochastic maximum principle for delayed mean-field stochastic differ-
ential equations and its applications. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 38, 3212-3217.
[13] R. Isaacs. Differential games, parts 1-4. The Rand Corpration, Research Memorandums Nos. RM-1391,RM-
1411, RM-1486, 1954-55
[14] Ekeland, I., & Te´mam, R., 1976. Convex Analysis and Variational Problems, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[15] Elliott, R., Li, X., & Ni, Y. H, 2013. Discrete time mean-field stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control
problems. Automatica, 49(11), 3222-3233.
[16] Hafayed, M. (2013). A mean-field maximum principle for optimal control of forward-backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations with Poisson jump processes. International Journal of Dynamics and Control, 1(4), 300-315
[17] Hafayed, M., Abbas, S., & Abba, A. (2015). On mean-field partial information maximum principle of optimal
control for stochastic systems with Lvy processes. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 167(3),
1051-1069.
[18] Li, J., 2012. Stochastic maximum principle in the mean-field controls. Automatica, 48, 366-373.
[19] Kallianpur, G., 2013. Stochastic filtering theory (Vol. 13). Springer Science & Business Media.
[20] Kohlmann, M., & Xiong, D. (2007). The mean-variance hedging of a defaultable option with partial information.
Stochastic analysis and applications, 25(4), 869-893.
[21] Ma, H., & Liu, B. , 2017. Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problem for Partially Observed Forward Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations of Mean-Field Type. Asian Journal of Control.
[22] Meng, Q., & Shen, Y.,2015. Optimal control of mean-field jump-diffusion systems with delay: A stochastic
maximum principle approach. Journal of computational and applied mathematics, 279, 13-30.
[23] Meyer-Brandis, T., Øksendal, B., Zhou, X.Y., 2012. A mean-field stochastic maximum principle via Malliavin
calculus. Stochastics, 84, 643-666.
[24] Øksendal, B. (2006). A universal optimal consumption rate for an insider. Mathematical Finance, 16(1), 119-
129.
17
[25] Sethi, S., & Thompson, G. (2000). Optimal Control Theory-Applications to Management Science and Eco-
nomics, Springer.
[26] Shen, Y., Meng, Q., & Shi, P., 2014. Maximum principle for mean-field jump-diffusion stochastic delay differ-
ential equations and its application to finance. Automatica, 50(6), 1565-1579.
[27] Shen, Y., & Siu, T.K., 2013. The maximum principle for a jump-diffusion mean-field model and its application
to the mean-variance problem. Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods & Applications, 86, 58-73.
[28] Tang, M., & Meng, Q. (2016). Partially Observed Optimal Control for Mean-Field SDEs. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1610.02587.
[29] Tang, M., & Meng, Q. (2010, July). Stochastic differential games of fully coupled forward-backward stochastic
systems under partial information. In Proceedings of the 29th Chinese Control Conference (pp. 1150-1155).
IEEE.
[30] Tang, S., 1998. The maximum principle for partially observed optimal control of stochastic differential equa-
tions. SIAM Journal on Control and optimization, 36(5), 1596-1617
[31] Wang, G., & Yu, Z. (2010). A Pontryagin’s maximum principle for non-zero sum differential games of BSDEs
with applications. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 55(7), 1742-1747.
[32] Wang, G., & Yu, Z. (2012). A partial information non-zero sum differential game of backward stochastic
differential equations with applications. Automatica, 48(2), 342-352.
[33] Wang, G., & Wu, Z.,2009. The maximum principles for stochastic recursive optimal control problems under
partial information. IEEE Transactions on Automatic control, 54(6), 1230-1242.
[34] Wang, G., Wu, Z., & Xiong, J. ,2013. Maximum principles for forward-backward stochastic control systems
with correlated state and observation noises. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 51(1), 491-524.
[35] Wang, G., Wu, Z., & Xiong, J.,2015a. A linear-quadratic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochas-
tic differential equations with partial information. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 60(11), 2904-2916.
[36] Wang, G., Wu, Z., & Zhang, C. ,2014a. Maximum principles for partially observed mean-field stochastic systems
with application to financial engineering. In Control Conference (CCC), 2014 33rd Chinese (pp. 5357-5362).
IEEE.
[37] Wang, G., Wu, Z., & Zhang, C. ,2016. A partially observed optimal control problem for mean-field type forward-
backward stochastic system. In Control Conference (CCC), 2016 35th Chinese (pp. 1781-1786). TCCT.
[38] Wang, G., Xiao, H., & Xing, G.,2015b. A class of optimal control problems for mean- field forward-backward
stochastic systems with partial information. arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.03729.
[39] Wang, G., Zhang, C., & Zhang, W., 2014b. Stochastic maximum principle for mean-field type optimal control
under partial information. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 59(2), 522-528.
[40] Xiong, J., Zhang, S., & Zhuang, Y. (2016). A partially observed non-zero sum differential game of forward-
backward stochastic differential equations and its application in finance. arXiv preprint arXiv:1601.00538.
18
